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1 In 2013, the Ministry of Justice in the United Kingdom embarked on radical reform of
the national probation service – in a policy known as Transforming Rehabilitation (TR)
– by dissolving 35 public Probation Trusts and replacing them with 21 contract zones,
operated by Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) on a commercial, for-profit
model.  These CRCs ‘managed’ individuals who were sentenced to custody (including
community supervision), and were assessed as posing ‘low’ or ‘medium’ risk to public
safety.  Clients  deemed  ‘higher-risk’  remained  under  the  jurisdiction  of  a  smaller
National Probation Service (NPS) which stayed in public ownership. This was a classic
private/public split, where the state remained responsible for ‘risky’ clients while the
private sector secured business volume, allowing profit to be made by fee per client
plus bonus payment if a client did not commit further crimes. In 2015, an oligopoly of
eight consortia won all of the contracts to run probation services until 2022. By July
2019, a succession of parliamentary inquiries and regulator’s reports concluded that
“mismanagement, risk taking, and the lack of properly considered planning has badly let down
offenders”.1 After five years of firefighting to maintain an evidently unsound structure,
the  end  was  precipitated  by  commercial  failure:  the  liquidation  of  Working  Links
(which operated three contract areas) in Spring 2018, and confirmed when Interserve,
Finding the Eye of the Octopus: the Limits of Regulating Outsourced Offender ...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXVI-2 | 2021
1
(which  ran  five  contract  areas  under  the  brand,  “Purple  Futures”)  went  into
administration in March 2019. 
2 Shortly  after,  the  Ministry  announced  the  early  termination  of  contracts  (by  14
months)  and  the  case  management  of  clients  deemed low and  medium risk  would
return  to  the  National  Probation  Service  (NPS).  This  did  not  amount  to  the
renationalisation of  probation,  as the revised model (Transforming Rehabilitation II
(TRII) was conceived along the same lines of competitive contracting, but with only ten
contract  lots  on offer,  which restricted competition and potentially  made the state
even  more  dependent  on  provider  oligopoly.  These  proposals  immediately  aroused
criticisms that the cosmetic changes would reproduce the same structural weaknesses
as the original version. However, on June 11, 2020, the Secretary of State [hereafter
Minister] for Justice made a statement to the House of Commons that all  probation
work  was  to  return  to  the  public,  state-run  probation  service  from  June  2021.
Community-based  rehabilitative  services  (amounting  to  about  a  fifth  of  probation
expenditure), which were previously undertaken by the private and charitable sectors,
would revert to the state sector, along with the workforce of the private Community
Rehabilitation  Companies.2 This  renationalisation  marked  a  full  reversal  of  the
Transforming Rehabilitation experiment. 
3 From the very start of this affair in 2014, revelations of political incompetence and
financial  waste  regularly  reached  the  public  domain  via  the  findings  of  several
parliamentary inquiries and regulators,3 but these scarcely disturbed the incumbent
government, at a time when British politics was dominated by the Brexit question. At
first glance, the lack of sanctions or political resignations for the momentous failure of
TR provided prima facie  evidence of  the desensitisation of  senior politicians to the
constitutional  obligations  set  out  by  the  principle  of  Ministerial  responsibility,  and
their sense of imperviousness to democratic accountability in the United Kingdom at
present. (The retirement in 2018 of Michael Spurr, the Chief Executive of the National
Offender Management Services (NOMS) and foremost civil servant with responsibility
for probation at the time, was widely viewed as having paid a personal price for the
failings  of  his  political  masters).  Yet,  this  outward  defiance  of  political  and  public
disquiet did not fully prevent accountability structures from eventually providing some
operational  correctives  and  robust  political  counternarrative.  Yet,  prior  to  the
dramatic  climbdown  of  June  2020,  legislators  and  regulators  had  been  unable  to
prevent  this  unfolding “policy  disaster”,  and  scarcely  mitigated  its  worst  effects.4
Throughout  the  lifetime of  TR,  regulatory  mechanisms had seriously  failed  to  hold
government to account.
4 As there is voluminous commentary on the political and ideological rationales behind
TR, the future shape of the probation service, and damage to the public interest as well
as  to  probation  staff,  providers  and  clients,  this  paper  will  confine  its  focus  t:  (i)
identifying the structures of accountability that were nominally in place to regulate
and govern this policy; (ii) considering the robustness or weaknesses of those systems
for  eliciting  transparency  and  accountability,  especially  given  the  complications
generated by outsourced service markets; (iii) conclude with a discussion of the impact
and limitations of regulatory interventions. Up to now, there has been little by way of
explicit focus on regulatory systems and their role. This is not because of a lack of such
systems. The UK has highly competent and sophisticated mechanisms for managing,
steering,  advising  and  eliciting  accountability  from  those  contracted  to  undertake
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public works at macro (political), meso (operational) and local (quality assurance and
performance) levels. The puzzle, rather, is why highly developed regulatory systems
were  apparently  unable  to  fulfil  elicit  full  accountability  or  make  appropriate
interventions to correct policy errors?
 
Accountability in outsourced public service markets
5 In public administration in the United Kingdom, systems of accountability derive from
strong  claims  about  the  democratic  imperative  which  informs  the  rules  of
transparency,  regulatory fairness  and political  responsibility.  This  understanding of
governance has in turn developed into a variety of more specific normative theories
such as civil service independence, concepts of the public interest, or accountability for
the  decisions  of  actors  acting  for,  or  on  behalf  of,  the  state.  “‘Accountability’  is  a
prerequisite to maintaining democracy in the Westminster system because it ties together the
‘doctrine  of  ministerial  responsibility…which bind[s]  ministers  into  supporting  all  aspects  of
government policy’” (otherwise known as collective responsibility) and “endows individual
Ministers with political responsibility for the conduct of their department”.5 However, from
the  1990s,  political  scientists  observed  “the  impact  of  a  new  accountability  dynamics”
which followed “political and administrative reforms and developments that have resulted in
changing modes of accountability across various levels of government within the UK”.6 Public
administration and service delivery involving commercial businesses as well as NGOs,
outsourcing and privatisation, and the rise of mixed (commercialised) service markets
in criminal justice, are making it more difficult to sustain consistent accountability, as
there  are  far  more  actors  and  regulatory  considerations  in  play.  In  parallel,  the
diffusion  of  regulatory  responsibilities  across  state  and  non-state  spheres,  has
necessitated the rise of disruptive new “modes of governance and New Public Management
(NPM)…  Increasingly  there  are  managerialist,  governance  and  regulatory  perspectives  of
accountability. Thus, the very concept of accountability has become a contested one”.7
6 Regulating outsourced public services in the UK (also called economic regulation) is a
case in point where procurement of public services is now oriented towards market
facilitation  and  management,  supplanting  traditional  public  sector  management
systems  with  New  Public  Managerialist  (NPM)  practices.  Since  2011,  public
procurement  practice  in  the  UK  has  been  based  on  the  following  core  normative
principles.  First,  there  is  the  position that  public  infrastructures  are  best  provided
through market competition.  Second, economic regulation should promote effective
competition where this is possible, or provide a proxy for competition “where it is not
meaningful to introduce competition”.8 Thirdly, economic regulation should be a “critical
enabler” of infrastructural investment, meaning that regulation is positively disposed
towards investors;  and fourthly,  regulation must  provide the “right  degree  of  clarity,
certainty and consistency” if investors are to be incentivised and if public and political
confidence is to be maintained.9 
7 This approach has further developed in a variety of more specific contexts, where, for
example,  the  original  regulatory framework,  which  was  developed  for  transport,
energy, or public utilities, for example, needed to be extended to ‘non-infrastructural
sectors  such  as  healthcare  and  criminal  justice.  Accordingly,  the  marketisation  of
erstwhile natural monopolies such as probation services necessitated the installation
(or extension) of economic regulatory powers to these ‘markets’. Subsequently, “five
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principles of good regulation” were formulated to “inform” both the design or reform of
services, as well as to “form the statutory basis of regulators’ duties”. These five principles
hold that any regulation should be transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent
and targeted.10 In the absence of political accountability, as in the case of TR, a sixth
rule could be added, which is only tacitly assumed in the guidelines; that regulatory
judgements ought to be independent.
8 What emerges are profound challenges for securing transparency in outsourced public
service markets, in terms of establishing public rights of scrutiny, putting regulatory
and  reporting  mechanisms  in  place,  and  keeping  pace  with  fluid,  fast-moving  and
changing  configurations  of  supplier  chains  involving  several  state  and  non-state
(business and NGO) actors in public contract delivery. These new conditions render the
current  hierarchical  system  of  transparency  obsolete,  inducing  new  concepts  of
‘accountability layers’ which start with “basic answerability”, build towards “amendatory
accountability” (changing systems, processes or policies which have caused problems)
towards “accountability which would allow for the exposure of office holders to sanctions in
cases of serious error”.11 Taking Miller and colleagues’ useful approach as a starting point,
this article identifies how governance and regulation proved to be complicated projects
with limited efficacy.  The challenges  to  transparency seem to  be  threefold.  Firstly,
eliciting  accountability  within  the  political  process;  secondly,  rendering  non-state
agencies  accountable  in  the  process  of  market  regulation  and  thirdly;  navigating
system complexity in the design and implementation of the TR framework. These fields
shall be analytically treated as discretely constituted by a distinct rationale or mission,
set  of  internal  procedures,  formal  and informal  rules,  and so  forth.  The discussion
identifies the principal dynamics in their formation (the policy field, the market, the
implementational field) and the subsequent influences in facilitating and implementing
TR.
 
Political accountability in the policy field
9 We start with executive political authority, which in turn implies that the conventions
of collective and ministerial responsibility ought to provide safeguards and constraints
against  acting  beyond their  powers  or  harmful  executive  action.  This  emphasis  on
political  accountability becomes critically important for establishing the nature and
source of responsibility for subsequent systemic deficiencies with TR. The impact of the
work  of  parliamentarians  exercising  their  powers  of  democratic  scrutiny,  mainly
through the influential  Justice Committee and Public Expenditure Committee of the
House of Commons, is salient, and is discussed later in the paper. Given the opacity of
decision-making processes with regards to TR, the analysis also draws on rare insider
perspectives from within the Ministry of Justice.
10 By the consensus of the wide range of perspectives referred to in this article, TR is a
textbook example of a policy which was implemented in the knowledge that its design,
costings,  funding,  and  delivery  systems  were  deficient.  The  TR  model  which  was
launched  in  2013  carried  forward  some  of  the  original  plans  for  a  “rehabilitation
revolution”,12 but differed crucially in its object and implementation. The Green Paper
on Breaking the Cycle (2010) was premised on addressing the:
fundamental failing of policy [which] has been the lack of a firm focus on reform
and rehabilitation, so that most criminals continue to commit more crimes against
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more victims once they are released back onto the streets.  The criminal  justice
system  cannot  remain  an  expensive  way  of  giving  the  public  a  break  from
offenders, before they return to commit more crimes.13
11 Future reforms, therefore, would comprise “an intelligent sentencing framework coupled
with  more  effective  rehabilitation”,  with  the  proposition  that  businesses,  social
enterprises, local authorities, and NGOs (third sector) would be contracted to provide
programmes and services as agents of rehabilitation. In order to make room for this
innovation “a  comprehensive  competition  strategy  for  prison  and  probation  services” (i.e.
future outsourcing of public resettlement services would follow in 2011.14
12 There  is  insufficient  space  to  recount  the  revision  from a  mixed  market  approach
which “continued to envisage a coherent and wholly public service” to the later version
where “localism [and] the continuing centrality of public sector probation of the earlier period
shifted dramatically to a form of heavily centralised contracting-out to the private sector”.15 TR
offered  a  seemingly  comprehensive  solution  to  a  cluster  of  political  exigencies
including crime, chronic recidivism (reoffending), supposedly failing public probation
(and prison) services, and the cost of crime, for example. The Probation Service was a
more  vulnerable  political  target  for  radical  dismantling  than  more  publicly  visible
services, such as prison or policing.16 Spending reviews (2010-11 and 2014-15) cut all
public expenditure in the UK by 27 per cent. In order that the Ministry of Justice could
adhere to heavy budgetary reductions, it became a political imperative to establish that
outsourced probation could be ‘cost neutral’, i.e. pay for itself with savings accrued.
Yet, some of these core premises were either wrong, or at best: “highly questionable and
evidence for them thin and lacking … Like most politicians, Grayling avoided the salient issue on
crime in our time: its collapse”.17 
13 These comments from the former Director of Finance for Prisons reflect a degree of
animus for the legacy of Chris Grayling, Secretary of State for Justice (2012-15), who
moved  the  legislation  for  part  privatisation  of  the  probation  service,  the  Offender
Management Act  (2014).18 Grayling pursued probation reforms along the hardest  of
centralised,  marketised lines  with singular  determination,  contrary to  the available
evidence or advice of his officials and by circumventing protocols for signing off on the
national implementation of policies.19 Trials of the programme and of the payment-by-
results system which were held in two prisons (HMP Doncaster and HMP Peterborough)
were terminated after interim findings reported marginal impact on reconviction rates,
and questioned whether the model could be replicated nationally.20 The Ministry was
subsequently  censured  for  making  “a  mistake”  in  proceeding  with  “reforms  without
completing thorough piloting”.21 
14 More  serious  was  the  culture  of  secrecy,  exemplified  by  the  suppression  of  a  risk
assessment  conducted  by  the  Major  Projects  Authority  in  2013.22 This  body,  which
appraises  cost  and logistical  risks  for  major  government projects,  placed TR at  the
highest levels of risk in several categories including estimations of an 80 per cent risk
of unacceptable drop in performance and a 51-80% risk that the programme would not
save public funds.23 
15 Interviews with legislators and senior civil servants at the Ministry during this period
bring  into  sharp  focus  how  overdetermined  ministerial  resolve  can  “destabilise  the
system, knocking out the whole system of checks and balances”.24 Annison’s ethnographic
research  with  Ministry  of  Justice  officials  revealed  “the  monomaniacal  fervour  to  get
probation reforms through”, and a culture of unrelenting pursuit of goals despite rational
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grounds for doubt as to their viability.25 Yet Annison shows the nuanced approach of
public  servants  who  balanced  “the  delivery  perspective”  with  their  traditional  civil
service  code  which  constrained them from crossing  into  ‘political’  decision-making
terrain.  Julian  Le  Vay,  an  architect  of  prison  outsourcing  and  enthusiast  for
competition,  also  witnessed  at  first  hand the  transition  from reform to  ideological
mission:
There was a strong case for exposing some probation services to competition …
[but] … The TR changes lack compelling rationale or evidence; are uncosted; require
extremely  rapid  implementation  of  new,  highly  complex  organisational  and
relational models for all participants simultaneously; use payment mechanisms that
are entirely untested and carry major risks of unforeseen consequences; rely on
new and untested suppliers; require high levels of competence in contracting and
contract management that the [Ministry of Justice] has recently been shown to lack;
and are being implemented at breakneck speed for no reason – and there appears to
be no recovery plan if TR goes badly wrong.26
16 Throughout the period of privatisation/outsourcing of probation, there was always a
divergence between ideology and the capacities that were achievable given existing
economic and political constraints. This does not reflect a simple technocratic/political
divide, as throughout the lifetime of the programme to the present, TR was a contested
field  where  technocracy  and  politics  combined  and  divided,  sometimes  along
unfamiliar  lines,  sometimes  creating  unexpected  alliances  and  outcomes  in  others.
Nevertheless, the policy can be viewed as an example of hubris (generated at the behest
of an intractably punitive,  pro-free market,  right-wing Minister),  which created the
context  for  later  confrontation  with  his  own  officials,  with  parliament,  with  civil
society,  and  eventually  with  the  Community  Rehabilitation  Companies  and
subcontractors, including charities, who were servicing the TR system. 
17 The  “rushed  implementation” of  TR  introduced  significant  risks  that  its  chosen
commercial  approach  “left  it  badly  placed  to  manage.”27 The  consequences  are  far-
reaching,  so  we  now  turn  to  examine  questions  of  transparency,  leading  to  risk
management and damage limitation exercises. 
 
Accountability and the probation market
18 Perspectives on the relationship between public service markets and accountability fall
into three broad positions: the first is that transparency is a functional necessity for
making markets work – by facilitating the exchange of accurate information, which in
turn underpins informed decisions and competitiveness – and therefore compliance is
in  actors’  self-interest.  The  question  for  this  approach  is  whether  regulatory
accountability is as effective, or necessary, as free (i.e. unregulated) market forces can
be. Whilst deregulation is often spoken of as a means to achieving free market ends,
these  means  can generate  conflicting  outcomes  which  merit  closer  analysis  when
applied to probation service markets. Firstly, outsourced public services are not fully
competitive markets, but quasi-markets, that is,  artificial economic hybrids that are
partially  protected  from full  exposure  to  supply  and  demand.  Those  favouring  the
discipline of free markets find fault with the impurity of quasi-markets on the grounds
that they increase the likelihood that the government will step in to protect strategic
public  services,  thereby  creating  actor  complacency,  leading  to  market  failures  or
operational laxity.28 By this logic, however, transparency ought to be even necessary in
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the case of such monopsony (a market situation in which there is only one ‘customer’ –
the state, in this case) or oligopoly (dominance by a few market leaders), yet market
homogeneity is rarely a target of regulatory scrutiny.
19 A second perspective reflects the status quo whereby regulatory structures are thought
to be pragmatic necessities for protecting public assets as well as the public interest,
but  this  duty  must  be  balanced  against  unjustified  disruption  to  the  market  or  to
market actors. This paper has already discussed this approach, so will not elaborate
further. 
20 A third position correlates state-created market building in offender resettlement with
corporate welfarism in the guise of privatisation and outsourcing.29 In denaturalising
claims that healthy self-interest incentivises market actors to abide by ‘light touch’ or
self-regulation, Ludlow remarks that free markets are misnomers in at least two senses.
The first is that the “free” market does not go unregulated; it means regulated in
ways to which most neo-liberals do not object…. The second sense…is that where
public services are subjected to competition, the market needs to be created and
cultivated  by  its  single  customer,  the  state:  a  public  service  market  does  not
spontaneously arise.30 
21 Another version of this critique inverts the “fabricated image of a lazy state and a dynamic
private  sector”,  pointing  instead  to  the  state’s  largesse  in  creating  de-risked  rent-
extraction  opportunities  where  the  public  interest  ultimately  loses  out:  “when  the
appropriation of rewards outstrips the bearing of risk in the innovation process, the result is
inequity.”31 Aspects of each of these arguments manifested in the internal incoherence
of the market model for probation, the features of which are discussed below.
22 But first, to reprise the rationale for adopting a market model, it is official policy that
private sector companies can be a highly effective option for public service delivery,
but  their  performance  depends  on  the  competitive  pressures  of  the  market.  It  is
believed that they perform at their peak when there is a financial incentive to do so,
but that more than one provider should ideally be contracted to perform similar tasks
to maintain competitive discipline. Competition, in turn, introduces a source of friction
into  the  operation  of  the  sector  in  question.  The  commissioning  framework  for
probation, accordingly, comprised potentially conflicting objectives. The first entailed
attracting  providers  with  significant  resources,  up-front  capital  and  large-scale
operational  capacity,  and  therefore  signalling  that  large  corporations  or
‘supercharities’ could be preferred Lead or Prime contractors. This model envisaged a
classic, trickledown subcontracting pyramid where the prime contractor (or contractor
consortium) handed out subcontracts to smaller, local outfits who would deliver the
programmes, while taking overarching control for delivering the contract. At the same
time, however, the Ministry also wanted the competitive benefits of “a market model
that  supports  a  wide  range  of  lead  providers,  and  partnerships  which”32 “ will  encourage
providers  to  draw  on  local  expertise  with  the  voluntary  and  community  sectors  and  local
delivery agencies”33 by introducing a widespread programme of competition and inviting
“providers from the private and voluntary sectors to deliver the majority of current probation
services”.34
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Squeezing out public and charitable sectors
23 The early phase of preparing the market for probation (2012-13) was structured around
commitments to creating diversified and inclusive markets which would comprise “a
mix of  expertise”,  and signalled that bids from not-for-profit  prime contractors were
encouraged.35 The ministry invested in “capacity building” for the market, reportedly
spending £15 million (€16.8m) on management consultants and £4m (€4.48m) on legal
services between March 2012 and April  2013.36 A reported £10 million(€11.21m) was
spent on hiring financial services consultancy firms to provide training and advisory
services to small social enterprises and charities requiring support to work up potential
bids as contractors or subcontractors, in order to equalise their chances against the
superior forces of large multinational corporate bidders. Diversifying the market was
thought to fulfil varying premises: to assure NGOs that they had a realistic stake, to
expand the competitive base, and to allay public disquiet at the oligopolistic dominance
of large transnational security corporations. Opening up the marketplace did not apply
to public sector probation trusts, who were barred from bidding for contracts unless
they formed consortia to prepare bids as Probation Mutuals.37
 
Oligopoly
24 As it  transpired,  all  but  one of  the  CRC contracts  were  awarded to  large  consortia
headed by for-profit companies. One probation mutual was successful. Ministry sources
briefed that unsuccessful bids were “due to [the] more limited resources and (lower) appetite
for risk” of charities and non-profits.38 However, unsuccessful bidders argued that the
competition had been stacked in favour of for-profit/large charity consortia who could
absorb financial risks; had made multiple bids for different areas; and could deliver to
economies of scale. For charitable and probation mutuals, “the rushed process” lacked
“genuine consultation” and affected their “capacity to understand and influence what was
going on”, especially as new criteria were being demanded “up to the deadline for tenders.” 
39Finally, at an advanced stage in the competition (in 2014), the Ministry introduced a
requirement  that  each  bid  should  have  a  Parent  Company  Guarantee  (PCG),  a
mechanism  whereby  bidders  had  to  “stake  assets  equivalent  to the  size  of  the  annual
contract value as a precondition for ownership of  a CRC.”40 This requirement is standard
practice in defence or large capital spending contracts, where it acts as security against
supplier bankruptcy, but in this case it effectively priced charitable, medium sized for
profits and mutual bidders out of the market.
 
Alienation of social investors
25 The ambition that TR would be cost neutral (i.e. would not cost the Treasury because of
savings by outsourcing) prompted government to reach out to social entrepreneurs and
philanthropic investors. Funders who had invested heavily in special investment bonds
to  part-finance  the  Peterborough and  Doncaster  trials  were  subsequently  alienated
when the  Ministry  terminated  them early.  Philanthropic  trusts  had initially  shown
interest but eventually offered lukewarm and qualified responses towards investing in
TR. This was reportedly (by NOMS) based on their supposedly ideological objections to
privatisation per se. However, their refusal to invest was because many perceived that
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they would in effect be ‘subsidising’ the profitability of private sector CRCs, which was
incompatible with their covenants and missions.41 
 
Built-in design failures
26 By 2016, it was publicly acknowledged that a number of CRCs were losing money. The
CRCs  attributed these  losses  to  flaws  with  the  payment-by-results  mechanisms and
inaccurate forecasts by the Ministry of Justice which allegedly inflated the figures for
referrals (clients) that they would receive (which depressed their client turnover, and
thus decreased payment per client). An alternative perspective, vindicated by events,
argued  that  the  incoherent  and  ill-considered  payment-by-results  formula  which
underpinned  the  contracting  system  meant  that  the  economics  of  TR  were
unworkable).42 In  late  2017,  it  was  reported  that  several  CRCs  had  approached
government to favourably adjust payment mechanisms and for additional money to
compensate for losses and to “provide greater financial certainty and to support the delivery
of  core operational  services”.43 News that the Ministry was engaged in “rolling contract
negotiations” with the CRCs – in effect, renegotiating the terms of their original contacts
– confirmed earlier suspicions that companies had originally under-estimated costs in
their  tenders  in  order  to  win  contracts,  or  factored  in  significant  losses  in  the
expectation that they could press for more favourable terms once this vital strategic
service was in their hands. Estimated extra payments cost £476 million (€531.5m) in
2017 alone but the Ministry of Justice has not disclosed particulars on the grounds of
commercial confidentiality.44
 
Barking watchdogs eventually bite
27 Because the part-privatisation of probation was so novel and controversial, it was in
the  sights  of  parliamentary,  regulatory  and  quality  assurance  scrutineers  from the
outset.45 Therefore, we encounter a contradiction whereby the problems with TR did
not proceed unseen, but carried on despite regulatory hyperactivity. This puzzle can
firstly be addressed by reference to ministerial disregard for conventional rules and
procedures,  and the exclusion of contrary advice from senior civil  servants (in this
sense,  TR  presages  what  has  become  normalised  since  the  2019  election).  As  the
administrative  debacle  unfolded,  parliamentary  committees  seemed  to  be  the  only
bodies  with  powers  to  hold  a  non-compliant  political  executive  to  account.46 The
watershed began when the  Justice  Committee  of  the  House  of  Commons  published
findings  from  its  inquiry  into  Transforming  Rehabilitation  (2018).  The  Committee
opened  with  the  statement  that  members  felt  obliged  to  seize  the  momentum  for
obtaining  overarching  parliamentary  accountability,  in  the  light  of  a  succession  of
critical  reports  from regulators  and  inspectorates,  which,  however  insightful,  were
limited in their powers of scrutiny and recommendation: 
At the beginning of this Parliament we agreed that in light of… the generally poor reports…
(both  inspection  reports  of  specific  Community  Rehabilitation  Companies  and  National
Probation Service areas as well as cross-cutting thematic reports) and oral evidence taken by
our predecessor Committee in March 2017, that an inquiry into Transforming Rehabilitation
would be one of the first inquiries that we launched in the 2017 Parliament.47
28 Once oversight moved to the more adversarial domain of parliament, it was anticipated
that the issue would become susceptible to political partisanship. Yet, bipartisanship
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prevailed on TR partly due to Grayling’s loss of political capital within his own party,
and partly because the executive “knew internally that [TR] was a mess”, according to his
own  Minister  of  State  (junior  minister).48 These  damning  verdicts  added  political
weight to a rising wave of censorious reports which reached a tipping point in May
2019, when the outgoing Chief Inspector of Probation, Dame Glenys Stacey, pronounced
that TR was “irredeemably flawed” and “not fit for purpose.”49 The source of this criticism
was  significant,  as  the  probation  and  prison  inspectorates  have  generally  enjoyed
credibility on basis of their rigorous and balanced scrutiny (although there is also a
tradition of trenchant parting commentary from departing chief inspectors).  In this
instance, Stacey’s comments and final report carried significant moral authority that
breached the government’s previously impervious stance. 
29 The  contemporary  struggle  over  accountability  also  derives  from  the  system
complexity which is introduced to the hybridised market-state. Outsourcing changes
the  shape  of  the  state,  in  the  process  shifting  loci  of  accountability  from  central
government to external and non-state actors. The paradoxical outcome is that, far from
decreasing,  state  power  is  reproduced  and  multiplied  through  the  diffusion  of
obligatory accountability to greater numbers of agents who carry out public welfare or
penal work in the local state or in civil society.50
30 Whilst this iteration of neo-liberal, penal governmentality produces governmental net-
widening via non-state actors, TR also facilitated the growth of state bureaucracy in two
ways. Firstly, marketisation and privatisation led to the creation of new bureaux and
workforces to monitor outsourced public contractual activity. Contract management
was not only prioritised as an activity within HMPPS/NOMS51, but the only workforce in
the prison and probation services that expanded was a new stratum of employees with
specialist contract and market management skills drawn from the financial sector to
strengthen  contract  management  and  address  “capability  gaps”.52 These  were
supplemented  with  “senior  commercial  professionals”  (consultants)  were  as  well  as
secondment of specialists from the Cabinet Office.53 The investment and size (84 full-
time equivalent employees) of the contract management team was critically contrasted
with  working  conditions  for  prison  regulators  by  Peter  Clarke,  Chief  Inspector  of
Prisons: 
We are surprised that it costs HMPPS and HMPPS Wales more staff and money to manage
the Ministry’s contracts with the 21 CRCs, than HMI Prisons has to inspect more than a
hundred prisons, as well as young offender institutions, secure training centres, immigration
removal centres, short-term holding facilities, police custody, military detention and court
custody.54 
31 With this double movement the asymmetry was made clear; market management not
only took precedence over conventional regulatory concerns with prison conditions,
standards  of  treatment  for  prisoners,  safeguarding  and  maintaining  public
transparency, etc., but the apparatus of market management exceeded the scale and
resources of established regulatory bodies. 
32 This  expansion  also  refuted  the  orthodoxy  that  marketisation  dispenses  with
unnecessary bureaucracy. Productivity monitoring of TR generated multiplying lines of
accountability which are characteristic of outsourced public services as all providers
must become arms of complex audit and reporting regimes. CRCs complained that they
were  accountable  to  a  plethora  of  governing  bodies,  structures  and  protocols.  The
House  of  Commons Justice  Committee  accepted that  providers  had been subject  to
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“overlap, duplication, differences in recommendations from… different auditing bodies auditing
at the same time”.55 One contractor, Sodexo, itemised the typical inspection and contract
regime with which they had to comply: submit data for monthly (desk-based) scrutiny
by the HMPPS/Ministry of Justice Contract Management unit; produce monthly data in
relation to contract oversight for Relationship Management Groups (held quarterly),
produce  quarterly  performance  reports  for  HMPPS  Operational  Assurance  Audits.
Additionally,  contractors  had  to  fulfil  the requirements  for  HMPPS  Accredited
Programme Audits and Ofsted Inspections (the inspectorate for schools and educational
providers);  attend  and  produce  material  for  Accuracy  meetings,  Contract  and
Performance meetings, and prepare for Joint Targeted Area inspections.56 In turn, these
companies  harvested from their  subcontractors  –  often charities  and smaller  social
enterprises  –  voluminous  and often meaningless  data  in  order  to  meet  criteria  for
claiming payment.
33 Here the discrepancy between deregulatory ideology and what the market wants is
clarified. The conceptual mistake comes from the neoliberal rhetoric which conflates
deregulation  with  freeing  up  markets,  whereas  the  former  is  highly  selective  in
demanding only ‘freedom from’ obligations such as taxation,57 employment rights and
conditions58 and pension and labour costs.59 In other respects, market players require
clear regulatory structures (albeit  in preferential  terms) in order to formalise their
interests vis-à-vis that of the buyer (the state). 
34 Ludlow’s  rebuttal  of  the  “fictitious  divide” between  regulatory  and  market  interests
applies here because the market demands and relies on credible terms, conditions and
protections in order for contestability or outsourcing to work. Substantial sweeteners
and guarantees were necessary to attract potential private providers. This was evident
during the market-building preparations for TR which sought to ensure that the right
contractors  (i.e.  large  capital  providers)  were  incentivised,  and  where  terms  were
subsequently renegotiated. 
35 Additionally, risk mitigation (underwritten by the state) is a prerequisite for offering
the market reassurance of profitable and stable business when they tender for and win
public service contracts. This can be defended as the state acting properly in ensuring
the continuity of critical public services which have been outsourced. However, the
state  concedes  considerable  bargaining  power  in  proffering  further  and  further
assurances. Contracts can be written to deter perverse outcomes, for example, where
payment-by-results  incentivises  ‘cream  skimming’  (where  contractors  select  clients
most likely to reach targets). However, such constraints on profit may have to be offset
with supplementary payments for higher-risk clients.
 
Conclusion
36 It is ill-conceived to position regulation in binary opposition to market efficiency in
public  services.  In  practice,  for-profit  contractors  are  more  or  less  reconciled  to
viewing regulation as a pragmatic necessity – where it services their interests – and
this question of degree of regulation remains a core contention. The regulatory burden
is a trade-off for the greater rewards of obtaining access to markets (for contractors) in
exchange for creating saving for the state (although savings do not accrue in many
cases).  Deregulatory  agendas  seek  to  eliminate  conditions  that  are  deemed  to  be
unnecessarily expensive where contractors are allowed to operate more cheaply by
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taking  fewer  precautions  to  protect  workers,  consumers,  standards  and  society.  In
other respects, bureaucratic overkill did not arise because of incessant state regulation,
but  because  it  was  supplemented with  actuarial  governance  in  the  form of  target-
setting,  performance  measurement  and  data-harvesting  which  are  characteristic  of
payment-by-results regimes in marketised public services.
37 To return briefly to Miller and colleagues’ accountability layers, we can see that the
rule of ‘basic answerability’ was satisfied to the degree that participants were obliged to
produce elementary and routine data about performance outputs, where information
of  importance  might  be  subsumed  within  the  details.  Nevertheless,  this  level  of
accountability is slippery as answerability is displaced onto ‘front line’ and peripheral
actors.  “Amendatory  accountability” which  is  gauged  towards  securing  “ the  redress  of
grievances and correcting errors” likewise occurred reactively and after the fact, where
regulators were able to identify “instances of proven error causing difficulties for clients or
service users”.60 Here, commissioners had recourse to contract management techniques
with a view to disciplining contractors through the use of financial sanctions, although
ultimately  contract  leverage  worked  to  the  advantage  of  corporate  welfare  by
subsidising and shoring up strategic markets. Our inquiry thus rests on whether the
problem lies with the ‘wrong kind’ of regulation or whether TR characterised systemic
lacunae in the regulatory structures. Certainly, the pursuit of political accountability
by  parliamentarians  potentially  allowed for  the  censure  of  office  holders,  although
little by way of sanctions were applied in cases of serious error. Even parliamentary
committees reached their limits of sanction in the face of a strong ministerial will to
proceed in defiance of evidence or normative rules and procedures. 
38 The privatisation of  probation in  England and Wales  revealed strains  in  regulatory
systems as conventional methods of oversight proved inadequate to holding complex,
networked supply chains of contractors and subsidiary agents to account. The public
management  of  outsourced  public  services  is  now  a  complex  and  multi-layered
prospect where conventional state regulatory agencies need to be augmented by new
para-state  governmental  techniques,  ranging  from  commissioning  to  new  public
managerialist-style performance measurement to micro-management at the point of
service delivery. While conventional regulators are restricted to scrutiny and making
recommendations,  new  managerialist  technocratic  measures  create  proliferating
demands  which  give  the  appearance of  regulating  while  failing  to  elicit  robust
accountability  on  the  substantive  problems.  Although  many  critics  focused  on  the
weaknesses of outsourcing, fewer paid attention to the limits of accountability in the
context  of  an  ideological  assault  on  probation.  The  lesson  is  that  regulatory
accountability and governance structures are limited in their capacity to trump bad
policy or rectify structural asymmetries and systemic flaws.
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ABSTRACTS
This  article  discusses  the  constraints  on,  and conflicts  over,  the  oversight  and regulation of
mixed public-private entities, using the part-privatisation of the probation service in England
and Wales – a policy called Transforming Rehabilitation (TR) – as its case study. The article shows
how TR embodied a policy and set of practices that effectively undermined both institutional and
political forms of scrutiny. Actions informed by neoliberal political dogma effectively strained
regulatory systems,  and short  circuited the most important dimension of  accountability in a
liberal democracy – accountability of ministers to parliament. Ironically, although TR was subject
to extensive regulatory scrutiny, the article concludes that these mechanisms were controverted
by ministerial disregard for rules, procedures or the advice of civil servants, demonstrating that
regulatory structures struggle to trump willfully pursued but ill-advised policy. 
Cet article analyse les contraintes et conflits qui entourent la supervision et la régulation des
partenariats public-privé, en prenant comme étude de cas la privatisation partielle du système de
liberté  conditionnelle en  Angleterre  et  au  pays  de  Galles,  programme  baptisé  Transforming
Rehabilitation. L’article  montre  que  ce  programme,  par  l’orientation  et  les  pratiques  qu’il  a
instaurées, a dans les faits fragilisé les mécanismes de régulation politiques et institutionnels. Des
actions  entreprises  au  nom  de  la  doxa  politique  néolibérale  ont  ainsi  mis  les  systèmes  de
régulation sous pression, et court-circuité l’incarnation la plus importante de la transparence
dans une démocratie libérale – la responsabilité des Ministres devant le Parlement. Bien que le
programme Transforming Rehabilitation ait, paradoxalement, fait l’objet d’importants dispositifs
de régulation, l’article conclut que ces mécanismes ont été contournés par des ministres qui ont
fait  fi  des  règles,  des  procédures  et  des  conseils  de  hauts  fonctionnaires,  ce  qui  montre
finalement que les systèmes de régulation ne parviennent pas à prendre le pas sur des actions
politiques menées avec beaucoup de volonté mais peu de clairvoyance. 
Finding the Eye of the Octopus: the Limits of Regulating Outsourced Offender ...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXVI-2 | 2021
17
INDEX
Mots-clés: privatisation, liberté conditionnelle, néolibéralisme, transparence politique, pouvoir
exécutif




Mary Corcoran is Reader in Criminology at the University of Keele, England, UK. She has
published widely on resistance and political imprisonment, women in penal systems, and the role
of civil society and third sector actors in criminal justice. Her current work focuses on
privatisation and marketisation in criminal justice fields. 
Finding the Eye of the Octopus: the Limits of Regulating Outsourced Offender ...
Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, XXVI-2 | 2021
18
